Published on Jan 1, 2013
サブタイトル：英語、ハンガリー語
二・二六事件の発生から終結までの四日間を、オールスターキャストで描いた五社英雄監督作品。原作・脚本は笠原和夫。
昭和11年2月26日。昭和維新を掲げた陸軍の青年将校たちは、1500人にも及ぶ決起部隊を率いてクーデターを起こした。彼らは雪の降る中、岡田首相、高橋蔵相、斎藤内大臣、鈴木侍従長などを襲撃。翌27日に戒厳令が施行され、決起部隊は原隊への復帰命令を受けた。原隊からの食糧提供も止められ、将校たちは自分の家族や恋人のことを思い返す。野中大尉は安藤大尉に部隊の原隊復帰を説得、最初は抵抗していた安藤も兵士たちを投降させることにした。安藤は拳銃自殺を図るが未遂に終わる。野中は拳銃で自決した。決起部隊の19人の将校たちは軍法会議で有罪となり、銃殺刑に処せられるのだった。
The
February 26 Incident (二・二六事件 Niniroku Jiken?) (also known as the
2-26 Incident) was an attempted
coup d'état in
Japan on 26 February 1936. It was organized by a group of young
Imperial Japanese Army
(IJA) officers with the goal of purging the government and military
leadership of their factional rivals and ideological opponents.
Although the rebels succeeded in assassinating several leading officials (including two former
Prime Ministers) and in occupying the government center of
Tokyo, they failed to assassinate the current Prime Minister
Keisuke Okada or secure control of the
Imperial Palace.
Their supporters in the army made attempts to capitalize on their
actions, but divisions within the military, combined with Imperial anger
at the coup, meant they were unable to achieve a change of government.
Facing overwhelming opposition as the army moved against them, the
rebels surrendered on 29 February.
[3]
Unlike earlier examples of political violence by young officers, the
coup attempt had severe consequences. After a series of closed trials,
19 of the uprising's leaders were executed for mutiny and another 40
imprisoned. The radical Kōdō-ha faction lost its influence within the
army, the period of "
government by assassination" came to a close, and the military increased its control over the civilian government.
The Imperial Japanese Army had a long history of
factionalism
among its high-ranking officers, originally stemming from domainal
rivalries in the Meiji period. By the early 1930s, officers in the high
command had become split into two main informal groups: the
Kōdō-ha "Imperial Way" faction led by Gen.
Araki Sadao and his ally Gen.
Jinzaburō Mazaki and the
Tōsei-ha "Control" faction identified with Gen.
Tetsuzan Nagata.
[4][5][6]
The Kōdō-ha emphasized the importance of Japanese culture, spiritual
purity over material quality, and the need to attack the Soviet Union
while the Tōsei-ha officers, who were strongly influenced by the ideas
of the contemporary German general staff, supported central economic and
military planning (total war theory), technological modernization,
mechanization, and expansion within China. The Kōdō-ha was dominant in
the army during Araki's tenure as Minister of War from 1931 to 1934,
occupying most significant staff positions, but many of its members were
replaced by Tōsei-ha officers following Araki's resignation.
[7][8]
The Young Officers
Army officers were divided between those whose education had ended at the
Army Academy (a secondary school) and those who had advanced on to the prestigious
Army War College.
The latter group formed the elite of the officer corps, while officers
of the former group were effectively barred by tradition from
advancement to staff positions. A number of these lesser-privileged
officers formed the army's contribution to the young, highly politicized
group often referred to as the "young officers"
(青年将校 seinen shōkō?).
[9][10]
The young officers believed that the problems facing the nation were the result of Japan straying from the "
kokutai"
(国体?)
(an amorphous term often translated as "national polity", it roughly
signifies the relationship between the Emperor and the state). The
"privileged classes" exploited the people, leading to widespread poverty
in rural areas, and deceived the Emperor, usurping his power and
weakening Japan. The solution, they believed, was a "Shōwa Restoration"
modeled on the
Meiji Restoration
of 70 years earlier. By rising up and destroying the "evil advisers
around the Throne", the officers would enable the Emperor to
re-establish his authority. The Emperor would then purge Western ideas
and those who exploited the people, restoring prosperity to the nation.
These beliefs were strongly influenced by contemporary nationalist
thought, especially the political philosophy of the former socialist
Ikki Kita.
[11]
The loose-knit group varied in size, but is estimated to have had
roughly a hundred regular members, mostly officers in Tokyo area. Its
informal leader was Mitsugi (Zei) Nishida. Nishida, a former army
lieutenant and disciple of Kita, had become a prominent member of the
civilian nationalist societies that proliferated from the late 1920s.
Nishida referred to the army group as the Kokutai Genri-ha
(国体原理派 "National Principle"?) faction. Involved to at least some extent in most of the political violence of the period, following the
March and
October Incidents of 1931, the army and navy members of the group split and largely ended their association with civilian nationalists.
[12][13][14]
Despite its relatively small size, the faction was influential, due
in no small part to the threat it posed. It had sympathizers among the
general staff and imperial family (most notably
Prince Chichibu,
the Emperor's brother (and, until 1933, heir), who was friends with
Nishida and other Kokutai Genri-ha leaders). Despite being fiercely
anti-capitalist, it had also managed to secure irregular funding from
zaibatsu leaders who hoped to shield themselves.
[15]
The exact nature of the relationship between the Kōdō-ha and the
Kokutai Genri-ha is complicated. The two factions are often treated as
the same or as two groups forming a larger whole. Contemporary accounts
and the writings of members of the two groups make clear they were
actually distinct groups in a mutually beneficial alliance, however. The
Kōdō-ha shielded the Kokutai Genri-ha and provided it with access while
they in exchange benefited from their perceived ability to restrain the
radical officers.
[16][17][18]
Political Violence
The years leading up to the February 26 Incident were marked by a
series of outbursts of violence by the young officers and their fellow
nationalists against their political opponents. Most notably, in the
May 15 Incident of 1932 young naval officers assassinated Prime Minister
Inukai Tsuyoshi.
This incident is significant because it convinced the young army
officers (who were aware of, but not involved in the attack) of the need
to utilize troops in any potential coup attempt. The ringleaders of the
incident, as in the previous March and October incidents, received
relatively light punishments.
[19]
The direct prelude to the coup, however, was the 1934
Military Academy Incident
(November Incident) and its consequences. In this incident Capt. Takaji
Muranaka and Capt. Asaichi Isobe, prominent members of the Kokutai
Genri-ha, were arrested for planning a coup with a group of military
cadets. Muranaka and Isobe admitted discussing such a coup, but denied
having any plans to actually carry it out. The military court
investigating the incident found there was insufficient evidence to
indict, but Muranaka and Isobe were suspended by the army. The two were
convinced that the incident was a Tōsei-ha attack on the young officers
and began circulating a pamphlet calling for a "housecleaning" of the
army and naming Nagata as the "chief villain". They were then expelled
from the army.
[20][21][22]
It was at this time that the last Kōdō-ha officer in a prominent
position, Gen. Mazaki, was forced from office. The young officers were
enraged by Mazaki's removal because, having become disillusioned with
Araki for his failures to overcome resistance in the cabinet during his
time as War Minister, Mazaki had become the focus of their hopes.
Muranaka and Isobe released a new pamphlet attacking Nagata for the
dismissal, as did Nishida.
[23][24][25]
On 12 August 1935, in the "
Aizawa Incident",
Lt. Colonel Saburō Aizawa, a member of the Kokutai Genri-ha and a
friend of Mazaki, murdered Nagata in his office in retaliation. Aizawa's
public trial (which began in late January 1936) became a media
sensation as Aizawa and the Kokutai Genri-ha leadership, in collusion
with the judges, turned it into a soapbox from which their ideology
could be broadcast. Aizawa's supporters in the mass media praised
Aizawa's "morality and patriotism", and Aizawa himself came to be seen
as "a simple soldier who sought only to reform the army and the nation
according to the true National Principle."
